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KANTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ECCLESIOLOGY
Philip L. Quinn

This paper begins with an outline of some of the main themes in the ecclesiology Kant presents in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. It then discusses implications of Kant's ecclesiology for issues concerning scriptural interpretation and religious toleration. With the help of these implications, an
objection to Kant's ccclesiology is developed, and a Kantian ecclesiology
modified in response to the objection is sketched out. The Roman Catholic
ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council is compared to both Kant's ecclesiology and the modified Kantian ecclesiology. It is argued that on some
points the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents movement in the direction of
Kant's ecclesio]ogy while on others tension between Kant and Vatican II can
be reduced by the modified Kantian ecclesiology.

Much recent work in philosophy of religion by Christian philosophers
has been done, so to speak, under a banner on which is emblazoned the
motto 'Faith Seeking Understanding.' That motto adorns the cover of this
journal. Such philosophy typically operates within a theological circle; it is
philosophical theology with philosophy firmly fixed in the adjectival position. It has produced noteworthy explications and defenses of such distinctively Christian doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation and the
Atonement.' It also stands in sharp contrast to the philosophy of religion
more customary in modernity since Hume, which views theological circles
from the outside. They are dimensions of human culture that form the
subject matter of religious studies, but philosophy, like the other disciplines that constitute religious studies, approaches them with secular
methods and assumptions. From this perspective, many distinctively
Christian doctrines are highly problematic; being revealed mysteries of
faith, they resist philosophical examination and on that account suffer from
neglect or perhaps misunderstanding by philosophers.
Yet recent Christian philosophical theology has not been comprehensive
in its engagement with theology. It is striking that it does not contain a
richly textured discussion of philosophical ecclesiology, a doctrine of the
church or churches. I think this is an unfortunate lacuna, and my hope is
that this paper will serve as a stimulus to a discussion that begins to fill the
gap. In order to be provocative, I focus on the ecclesiology Kant sets forth
in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone and The Conflict of the Faculties.
Some Christians will probably find my choice of a starting point odd if not
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offensive. As John Hare observes, "especially in America, Christians who
know about Kant tend to think of him as the major philosophical source of
the rot which has led to the decline of Christianity in the West in the last
two hundred years. He is seen as having taken a decisive step, perhaps the
decisive step, away from the traditional faith."2 I disagree with this view.
Like Hare, I take seriously what he calls the Christian seriousness of Kant.
I plan to argue that Kant's ecclesiology contains a lesson that contemporary
Christian philosophical theologians would do well to learn.
The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I give a rough sketch
of some of the main themes in Kant's ecclesiology. The second lays out
Kant's solutions to two important problems; they concern scriptural interpretation and religious toleration. In the third, r consider a major objection
to Kant's views and suggest a modified Kantian ecclesiology that tries to
accommodate the aspect of it that I find persuasive. The fourth and final
section compares the Roman Catholic ecclesiology of the Second Vatican
Council with both Kant's ecclesiology and my modified Kantian ecclesiology. It argues that on some points the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents
substantial movement in the direction of Kant's ecclesiology while on other
points tension between Kant and Vatican II can be reduced by my modified Kanhan ecclesiology.
1. Kant's Ecclesiology

In response to doubts about the work's intention, Kant begins the preface to the second edition of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone with an
explanation of what he hopes to accomplish in the book. Since a faith that
purports to contain historical revelation can include the pure religion of
reason while the latter cannot include what is historical in the former, he
tells us, we should make the experiment of regarding the two as related
like a pair of concentric circles. The pure religion of reason will be contained within the inner circle, and the philosopher, as a teacher of pure reason according to a priori principles alone, will be restricted to the inner circle. If this experiment succeeds, Kant wants us to conduct another. It is to
examine alleged revelation, which is to be found in the part of the outer circle not contained in the inner circle, in the light of moral concepts in order
to "see whether it does not lead back to the very same pure rational system
of religion. 1 If it does, Kant thinks, "we shall be able to say that reason can
be found to be not only compatible with Scripture but also at one with it, so
that he who follows one (under guidance of moral concepts) will not fail to
conform to the other" (p. 11). For Kant, much is at stake in the second
experiment because he thinks all of us are committed to the pure religion
of reason by virtue of our possession of reason. So if the second experiment succeeds, those of us who are also committed to revelation cannot be
shown to have inconsistent commitments provided we interpret revelation
in the light of moral concepts. If this is not the case, Kant sees only two
possibilities for those who are committed to revelation. Either they will
have two religions within them, and the two will be inconsistent. Or they
will have within them the pure religion of reason and a conflicting cult of
ceremonial worship. However this combination is bound to be unstable
II
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because a cult has value only as a means. As Kant puts it, if the religion of
reason and a ceremonial cult conflict, then, though shaking them up
together might temporarily unite them, "directly, like oil and water, they
must needs separate from one another, and the purely moral (the religion
of reason) be allowed to float on top" (p. 12). Clearly Kant's project then is
to use the pure religion of reason, if it is possible to do so, as a critical control on faith that relies on purported historical revelation.
How does the project provide a way into a discussion of ecclesiology?
In Book One of the Religion, Kant argues that we all suffer from a propensity to evil which is itself evil because we have brought it upon ourselves
and are thus accountable for it. In Book Two, he goes on to contend that
each of us can, because he or she ought to do so, carry out a moral revolution, aided by extrahuman assistance we cannot understand if it is needed,
that dethrones, though it cannot eradicate, the evil propensity, depriving it
of sovereignty over us. 4 But even if each of us overthrows the sovereignty
of this evil principle, all of us remain at risk and in danger that its sovereignty will be reestablished because we have not yet removed ourselves
from an ethical state of nature, as it were, in which we are apt to corrupt
one another. According to Kant, in such a state "despite the good will of
each individual, yet because they lack a principle which unites them, they
recede, through their dissensions, from the common goal of goodness and,
just as though they were instruments of evil, expose one another to the risk
of falling once again under the sovereignty of the evil principle" (p. 88).
Our response to this risk ought to be to bestir ourselves to leave the ethical
state of nature in order to become members of an ethical commonwealth.
Kant thinks we have a duty to do so.'
An ethical commonwealth is to be distinguished from a political state.
In a political state, we stand under coercive laws that regulate outer behavior while, in an ethical commonwealth, only non-coercive laws concerning
inner morality, laws of virtue alone, unite us. Moreover, unlike moral
laws, which concern what we are certain lies within our power, the idea of
an ethical commonwealth involves "working toward a whole regarding
which we do not know whether, as such, it lies in our power or not" (p.
89). Hence the duty to endeavor to become members of such a social
union is, according to Kant, a sui generis duty of the human race toward
itself. Since public human laws can only regulate outer behavior, we cannot think of ourselves as the legislators of an ethical commonwealth. Nor
can we suppose that its laws are statutes enacted merely by the will of a
superior being, divine positive laws, for in that case they would not be
moral laws and the duty to comply with them would not be the free duty
of virtue. Kant concludes that "only he can be thought of as highest lawgiver of an ethical commonwealth with respect to whom all true duties,
hence also the ethical, must be represented as at the same time his commands; he must therefore also be 'one who knows the heart,' in order to
see into the innermost parts of the disposition of each individual and, as is
necessary in every commonwealth, to bring it about that each receives
whatever his actions are worth" (pp. 90-91). But the concept of such a
highest legislator just is the concept of God as moral ruler of the world.
And so an ethical commonwealth must be thought of as "a people under
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divine commands, i.e., as a people of God, and indeed under laws of virtue"
(p. 91). Of course, for Kant, a people of God is not a state with a theocratic
constitution in which humans are subject to divine statutory laws; the
divine legislation of a people of God is reason's moral self-legislation transformed into a public principle of social union. Thus the idea of an ethical
commonwealth as a people of God under laws of virtue possesses objective
reality in human reason itself, and it fits comfortably within Kant's inner
circle, where it contributes, as we shall see, to his account of the pure religion of reason.
Kant considers this idea a sublime ideal, but he is not optimistic about
our prospects for realizing it on earth under our own steam. He tells us
that it is never wholly attainable and dwindles markedly under human
hands; he thinks something about sensuous human nature circumscribes
the means at our disposal for embodying it in any human institution.
Given the stuff we are made of and the evil propensity we have brought
upon ourselves, how, he asks rhetorically, "can one expect something perfectly straight to be framed out of such crooked wood" (p. 92)?6 He therefore suggests that founding a moral people of God is really a task only God
can consummate, but he also insists that we must proceed as if everything
depends upon us. What shall we do now to prepare ourselves for the
divine completion of our endeavors? Kant's answer to this question is his
ecclesiology.
For Kant, an ethical commonwealth under divine moral legislation is a
church. Considered merely as an ideal, such an ethical commonwealth
may be thought of as the church invisible. An actual social union of
humans that harmonizes with this ideal is a visible church, and "the true
(visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) kingdom of God on earth
so far as it can be brought to pass by men" (p. 92). The political constitution of the true visible church will be neither that of a monarchy, ruled by a
pope or patriarch, nor that of an aristocracy, ruled by bishops and other
prelates. It will not be a democracy in which each member is governed by
special inspiration or private illumination. Kant thinks its constitution is
best grasped in terms of a domestic analogy familiar from Christian piety.
The true visible church will be like "a household (family) under a common,
though invisible, moral Father, whose holy Son, knowing His will and yet
standing in blood relation with all members of the household, takes His
place in making His will better known to them" (p. 93). So our endeavors
are to be directed to doing what we can to bring about the existence of the
true visible church and our membership in it.
One might consider it an easy task to bring about the existence of the
true visible church. Since its divine legislation is also reason's self-legislation, reason itself tells us what its laws must be. Hence it may seem that
pure religious faith, which consists of belief in God together with our belief
in morality's laws, suffices to enable us to bring the true visible church into
existence. Kant rejects this optimistic view. He insists that "by reason of a
peculiar weakness of human nature, pure faith can never be relied on as
much as it deserves, that is, a church cannot be established on it alone" (p.
94). As a Inatter of empirical fact, churches always originate in historical or
revealed faiths. But such faiths contain not only moral laws that are uni-
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versally binding but also specifications of the organizational norms of concrete social unions or congregations. Kant thinks the question of how a
church ought to be organized under particular conditions of experience
"appears to be unanswerable by reason alone and to require statutory legislation of which we become cognizant only through revelation, i. e., an historical faith which, in contradistinction to pure religious faith, we can call
ecclesiastical faith" (p. 96). We have no way of knowing whether or not
such organizational statutes are divine statutory law. On the one hand, it
would be presumptuous to assume that they are, because doing so might
lead us to neglect the task of trying to improve the church's form. On the
other, it would be equally presumptuous to deny that they are if they are
completely harmonious with morality and, in addition, we cannot account
for them in terms of normal processes of cultural development. Because of
a weakness in human nature, Kant concludes, "in men's striving toward an
ethical commonwealth, ecclesiastical faith thus naturally precedes pure
religious faith; temples (buildings consecrated to the public worship of God)
were before churches (meeting-places for the instruction and quickening of
moral dispositions), priests (consecrated stewards of pious rites) before
divines (teachers of the purely moral religion)" (p. 97).
Yet, morally speaking, the temporal order of precedence is the reverse of
the correct order; pure religious faith morally precedes ecclesiastical faiths.
Statutory ecclesiastical faith should be only a vehicle for pure religious
faith, and observance of the statutes specified by ecclesiastical faith is only
a means to reaching the goal of living as a member of an ethical commonwealth. Nevertheless, Kant supposes the vehicle is important. Its purpose
is to preserve pure religious faith and insure its propagation in the same
form to various times and places. According to Kant, ecclesiastical faiths
founded on scriptures are better suited to serving this purpose than those
merely grounded in tradition. History shows, he tells us, that "it has never
been possible to destroy a faith grounded in scripture, even with the most
devastating revolutions in the state, whereas the faith established upon tradition and ancient public observances has promptly met its downfall when
the state was overthrown" (p. 98). Even if one doubts these sweeping historical generalizations, one can easily see the plausibility of the suggestion
that scriptural faiths are, other things being equal, better able to preserve
and propagate themselves than those that rest entirely on custom and oral
tradition.
For Kant, there is only one pure religion of reason, which consists of
belief in morality and morality's God. The pure religion of reason can,
however, be consistently embedded in more than one ecclesiastical faith,
and so many ecclesiastical faiths, all of which are its vehicles, are only to be
expected. In terms of Kant's analogy with the pair of concentric circles, the
inner circle can be consistently contained in a variety of outer circles. Kant
seems willing to allow that several ecclesiastical faiths actually do, or could
come to, serve as vehicles for the religion of pure reason. He says: "There
is only one (true) religion; but there can be fi7iths of several kinds. We can
say further that even in the various churches, severed from one another by
reason of the diversity of their modes of belief, one and the same true religion can yet be found" (p. 98). None of these churches is, as it stands, iden-
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tical with the true visible church, for all of them lack the universality Kant
regards as a mark of the true visible church. All of them, being based on
ecclesiastical faiths, contain elements of historical or revealed faith that cannot command, as the pure religion of reason can, universal assent, because,
Kant contends, "an historical faith, grounded solely in facts, can extend its
influence no further than tidings of it can reach, subject to circumstances of
time and place and dependent upon the capacity [of men] to judge the
credibility of such tidings" Cp. 94). Yet each such church contains within
the shell of its ecclesiastical faith, so to speak, a kernel that is the pure religion of reason. Each has within it the potential to grow closer to the true
visible church.
According to Kant, it is incumbent on us, in striving toward an ethical
commonwealth, to liberate the kernel from the shell to the extent that it is
humanly possible for us to do so. How far can we hope to get in this project? On this question, Kant appears to be of two minds. In one passage,
he expresses an optimistic moral eschatology. He predicts that "in the end
religion will·gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds
and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency
of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the
good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, 'so that
God may be all in all'" Cp. 112, my emphasis). But shortly thereafter he
cautions us that this divine ethical state on earth "is still infinitely removed
from us" Cp. 113). And in a less optimistic projection, though he insists that
"we ought even now to labor industriously, by way of continuously setting
free the pure religion from its present shell, which as yet cannot be
spared," he immediately goes on to say of ecclesiastical faith "not that it is
to cease (for as a vehicle it may perhaps always be useful and necessary)
but that it be able to cease; whereby is indicated merely the inner stability
of the pure moral faith" Cp. 126). So Kant, in one frame of mind, predicts
that the pure religion of reason will eventually become freestanding and
the true visible church will be realized on earth. In another, however, he
more guardedly claims that, though it could be freestanding, the pure religion of reason may never actually succeed in becoming free of the shell of
ecclesiastical faith. Yet, in either case, we ought even now to do what we
can, in striving toward an ethical commonwealth, to liberate the pure religion of reason from the shell of ecclesiastical faith and to realize the true
visible church on earth.
A famous paragraph in which Kant lays out a taxonomy can be put to
work in summing up his ecclesiology. It goes as follows:
Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as
divine commands. That religion in which I must know in advance
that something is a divine command in order to recognize it as my
duty, is the revealed religion (or the one standing in need of a revelation); in contrast, that religion in which I must first know that something is my duty before I can accept it as a divine injunction is the natural religion. He who interprets the natural religion alone as morally
necessary, i. e., as duty can be called the rationalist (in matters of
belief); if he denies the reality of all supernatural divine revelation he
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is called a naturalist; if he recognizes revelation, but asserts that to
know and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to religion, he
could be named a pure rationalist; but if he holds that belief in it is necessary to universal religion, he could be named the pure supernaturalist in matters of faith (pp. 142-143).
Where does Kant himself fit into this set of categories? The question bristles with difficulties.
Kant tells us that his distinction between natural and revealed religion is
meant to classify religion with reference to its first origin and inner possibility. In these terms, the pure religion of reason is the natural religion, and
various ecclesiastical faiths are forms of the revealed religion. Kant himself
is a rationalist of some kind; he thinks our moral duties are exhausted by
those prescribed by the pure religion of reason. He is not a naturalist, for
he does not deny the reality of supernatural revelation. A rationalist, he
tells us, "will never contest either the inner possibility of revelation in general or the necessity of a revelation as a divine means for the introduction
of true religion; for these matters no man can determine through reason"
(p. 143). Kant contests neither of them. Nor is he a pure supernaturalist.
Far from being necessary to universal religion, historical revelation is a formidable if not insurmountable obstacle to universality. Thus the only
thing left in Kant's taxonomic scheme for him to be is a pure rationalist.
But if he falls into this category, he not only does not deny the possibility of
revelation he affirms its actuality.
But classifying Kant as a pure rationalist by default is problematic.
Clearly it is possible to hold that accepting revelation is not necessary for
religion and neither to deny the reality of revelation, as the naturalist does,
nor to affirm its reality, as the pure rationalist does. In other words, there
is logical space in Kant's taxonomy for another category. Since he does not
give it a name, I propose to call those who fall into it agnostic rationalists.
We can then raise this question: Why should we classify Kant as a pure
rationalist rather than as an agnostic rationalist?
The answer, I think, begins to emerge when we note that Kant classifies
religion not only with respect to first origin and inner possibility, as noted
above, but also with respect to its capacity for being widely shared with
others. In terms of the latter classification, we have "either the Ilatural religion, of which (once it has arisen) everyone can be convinced through his
own reason, or a learned religion, of which one can convince others only
through the agency of learning (in and through which they must be guided)" (p. 143). According to this classification, the pure religion of reason is
natural. Moreover, it seems possible for there to be a religion that is both
natural, because everyone can be convinced of it through reason, and
revealed in terms of its origin, because its revelation contains nothing
incompatible with what reason is capable of discovering. Noting this possibility, Kant says that "such a religion, accordingly, can be natural, and at the
same time revealed, when it is so constituted that men could and ought to have
discovered it of themselves merely through the use of their reason, although
they would not have come upon it so early, or over so wide an area, as is
required" (pp. 143-144). I consider it characteristic of Enlightenment
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thought to take this possibility seriously. Kant seems almost to be echoing
Lessing, who had earlier said that "revelation gives nothing to the human
race which human reason could not arrive at on its own; only it has given,
and still gives to it, the most important of these things first."7 I suggest that
Kant takes Christianity, properly interpreted, to be a religion that is both
natural and revealed and accepts it thus understood. He therefore recognizes its revelation and is indeed a pure rationalist. s
Support for my suggestion can be found in Kant's explicit discussions of
Christianity. He first discusses the Christian religion as a natural religion.
After summarizing some of the moral doctrines expounded by the figure
he describes as the Teacher, Kant delivers the following somewhat convoluted but nevertheless highly favorable verdict: "Here then is a complete
religion, which can be presented to all men comprehensibly and convincingly through their own reason; while the possibility and even the necessity of its being an archetype for us to imitate (so far as men are capable of
that imitation) have, be it noted, been made evident by means of an example without either the truth of those teachings nor the authority and worth
of the Teacher requiring any external certification (for which scholarship or
miracles, which are not matters for everyone, would be required)" (p. 150).
Kant also discusses the Christian religion as a learned religion. If
Christianity as a learned religion is not to conflict with the natural religion
within it, Kant maintains, "recognition and respect must be accorded, in
Christian dogmatic, to universal human reason as the supremely commanding principle in a natural religion, and the revealed doctrine, upon
which a church is founded and which stands in need of the learned as
interpreters and conservers, must be cherished and cultivated as merely a
means, but a most precious means, of making this doctrine comprehensible, even to the ignorant, as well as widely diffused and permanent" (pp.
152-153). It is not obvious which doctrine Kant has in mind when he refers
to the project of making a certain doctrine comprehensible, widely diffused
and permanent. However, it makes little sense to suppose that the
revealed doctrine is to be cherished as a mere means to making itself comprehensible. So I believe we should understand Kant's thought to be that
the revealed doctrine is to be cherished and cultivated as a mere means to
making the doctrine of natural religion within Christianity comprehensible, widely diffused and permanent.9
What is the relation, by Kant's lights, between actual Christian churches,
founded on the revealed doctrines of Christianity, and his ideal of a true
church? Clearly no actual Christian church has yet become the true visible
church. But has any of them become a true church in some other sense?
Kant's criterion for addressing this question is the following: "When, therefore, (in conformity with the unavoidable limitation of human reason) an
historical faith attaches itself to pure religion, as its vehicle, but with the
consciousness that it is only a vehicle, and when this faith, having become
ecclesiastical, embraces the principle of a continual approach to pure religious faith, in order finally to be able to dispense with the historical vehicle, a church thus characterized can at any time be called the true church;
but, since conflict over historical dogmas can never be avoided, it can be
spoken of only as the church militant, though with the prospect of becom-
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ing finally the changeless and all-unifying church tri1lmphant" (p. 106). I
dare sav no actual Christian church in Kant's dav had either become conscious ~f the historical or revealed portion of its doctrine as a mere vehicle
or embraced the principle of approaching a purely moral religion in order
to be able to dispense with that historical vehicle. I also think no actual
Christian church in our day has done either of these things. Judged by
Kant's standard, no actual Christian church has yet become the true
church, not even the true church militant. By his lights, then, the reformation of Christianity, bravely begun by Luther and Calvin, still has a long
way to gO.1O
ll. Two implications of Kallt's Ecclesiology

Kant's ecclesiology influences his views on many topics that should be
of interest to Christian philosophers. I shall discuss only two of these topics: scriptural interpretation and religious tolerance. Both are of considerable intrinsic importance. However, I focus on Kant's views about them
chiefly because his views on these topics provide a basis for my criticism of
fundamental features of his ecclesiology.
According to Kant, the pure religion of reason ought to serve as the
interpreter of ecclesiastical faiths. If an ecclesiastical faith's revelation is to
be united or harmonized with the pure religion of reason and not to separate from it like water from oil, an interpretation of the revelation is
required that agrees with the universal moral rules laid down by practical
reason. When the revelation is contained in scripture, as Kant thinks it best
that it should be, interpretation will consist of textual exegesis. He cautions us that "frequently this interpretation may, in the light of the text (of
the revelation), appear forced-it may often really be forced; and yet if the
text can possibly support it, it must be preferred to a literal interpretation
which either contains nothing at all [helpful] to morality or else actually
works counter to moral incentives" (pp. 100-101). In The Conflict of tlze
Faculties, Kant proposes a specific principle of scriptural exegesis. It says
this: "If a scriptural text contains certain theoretical teachings which are proclaimed sacred but which transcend all rational concepts (even moral ones),
it may be interpreted in the interests of practical reason; but if it contains
statements that contradict practical reason, it must be interpreted in the
interests of practical reason."l1 Examples Kant provides can be used to
illustrate the two clauses of this principle at work.
Consider first the topic of Christology. According to a high Christology,
Christ possesses both a divine nature and a human nature, united in a single person. Kant can find nothing in such a conception that serves the
interests of practical reason. As he points out, if we think of Christ "as the
Divinity 'dwelling incarnate' in a real man and working as a second nature
in him, then we can draw nothing practical from this mystery: since we
cannot require ourselves to rival a God, we cannot take him as an example."!2 In addition, we must confront the puzzle of why, if such a union
can be brought about in one case, God does not produce it in every human
case, thereby making all of us essentially well-pleasing to God. But Kant
does find something that serves the interests of practical reason in a
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Christology which interprets Christ as the personification of the idea of
humanity in its complete moral perfection. Hence he considers it permissible for him to employ this idea in interpreting scriptural texts that, if taken
more literally, seem to support a high Christology. In a famous passage,
he offers such an interpretation of the first verses of the Prologue to John's
Gospel. It goes as follows:

Mankind (rational earthly existence in general) in its complete mornl
perfection is that which alone can render a world the object of a divine
decree and the end of creation. With such perfection as the prime
condition, happiness is the direct consequence, according to the will
of the Supreme Being. Man so conceived, alone pleasing to God, "is
in Him through eternity"; the idea of him proceeds from God's very
being; hence he is no created thing but His only-begotten Son, "the
Word (the Fiat!) through \vhich all other things are, and without
which nothing is in existence that is made" (since for him, that is, for
rational existence in the world, so far as he may be regarded in the
light of his moral destiny, all things were made) (p. 54).
Nicholas Wolterstorff intriguingly likens the sketch of an interpretation in
this passage to "Brendel's giving one of his pupils some suggestions for
interpreting the Hl1mmerklavier."13 No doubt some Christian readers of the
Prologue to John's Gospel will consider the interpretation Kant sketches
arbitrary or capricious; others will view his suggestions as forced or
strained. To the charge of arbitrariness, Kant could respond that his interpretation is constrained by the interests of practical reason. Taking Christ
to be a personification of the idea of humanity in its complete moral perfection provides us with a vivid paradigm to imitate in our moral striving. As
we have seen, Kant would not be bothered by the objection that his interpretation is forced. Even if it is, he would insist, provided the text can support it, if only barely so, it is permissible and, indeed, must be preferred to
more literal rivals that do not serve the interests of practical reason.
Consider next the narrative in Genesis 22 of the akcdah, the binding of
Isaac. According to the story, God commands Abraham to sacrifice his
beloved son, innocent Isaac, and Abraham consents to do so. If the stOry is
taken to be literally true, Abraham actually is divinely commanded to "kill
Isaac. For Kant, however, Abraham clearly has a moral duty not to kill
Isaac derived from practical reason, and so Abraham must be represented
as divinely commanded not to kill Isaac. Hence the story, taken literally,
contradicts practical reason in the sense that together they yield the result
that Abraham is divinely commanded to perform each member of a pair of
contradictory actions. According to the second clause of his principle of
scriptural exegesis, Kant must interpret Genesis 22 in the interests of practical reason. He does so by denying, in effect, that God ever told Abraham
to sacrifice Isaac. As Kant sees it, "in some cases man can be sure that the
voice he hears is not God's; for if the voice commands him to do something
contrary to the moral law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may
be, and no matter how it may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he must
consider it an illusion."" And in a footnote Kant goes on to say that

522

Faith and Philosophy

"Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: 'That I
ought not to kill my good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition,
are God-of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice
rings down to me from (visible) heaven.'''l' So Kant defends the interests
of practical reason in the case of the story of the akedah by insisting that, if
Abraham heard a voice commanding him to sacrifice Isaac that seemed to
be God's, he could and should have been sure that it was instead the voice
of an illusory apparition. He does not suggest that the story provides any
positive service to those interests. But I suppose one might read it in a
morally edifying way by holding that the point of having the angel in the
story allow Abraham to sacrifice a ram rather than Isaac was to teach that
God disapproves of human sacrifice.
Since we are two centuries more removed than Kant was from the
Wars of Religion, religious toleration is perhaps a less burning issue for
us than it was for him. In the West, it is largely taken for granted now,
except in peripheral trouble spots such as Beirut, Belfast and Bosnia. But
for most of the common era respectable Christian opinion endorsed the
use of the coercive power of the state to persecute religious dissent.
From the time of Augustine onward, Luke 14:23 was often cited as justification in revelation for such an endorsement. In that verse, which is contained in the Parable of the Great Dinner, the master says to the slave,
"Go out into the roads and lanes, and compel people to come in, so that
my house may be filled." Advocates of religious toleration before Kant,
for instance, Pierre Bayle in his Philosophical Commentary on the Words of
the Gospel, "Compel them to come in," had grappled with this text. l6 Kant
alludes to it in a brief treatment of toleration.
Kant's discussion of toleration is set in the context of an exposition of his
doctrine of conscience. He defines conscience as "a state of consciousness
which in itself is duty" (p. 173). Opposing the probabilist principle that the
opinion that an action may well be right is sufficient to justify performing
it, he insists that I must be sure that any action I propose to perform is
right. In other words, I have a duty to be conscious that any action I intend
to perform is right. Kant illustrates how the duty of conscience works with
the case of an inquisitor who is called upon to pass judgment on someone
charged with heresy but otherwise a good citizen. Is it morally permissible
for the inquisitor to condemn the accused person to death? In a sentence
that alludes to the famous verse from Luke's Gospel, Kant asks us to suppose that the inquisitor "was firm in the belief that a supernaturally
revealed Divine Will (perhaps in accord with the saying, compel/ife intrare)
permitted him, if it did not actually impose it as duty, to extirpate presumptive disbelief together with the disbelievers" (pp. 174-175). But does
the inquisitor's belief, firm though we suppose it to be, have a high enough
epistemic status that the inquisitor can in good conscience intend to act on
it? In a familiar passage in which he alludes to the akedah, Kant returns a
negative answer to this question. It goes as follows:
That it is wrong to deprive a man of his life because of his religious
faith is certain, unless (to allow for the most remote possibility) a
Divine Will, made known in extraordinary fashion, has ordered it
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otherwise. But that God has ever uttered this terrible injunction can
be asserted only on the basis of historical documents and is never
apodictically certain. After all, the revelation has reached the inquisitor only through men and has been interpreted by men, and even did
it appear to have come to him from God Himself (like the command
delivered to Abraham to slaughter his own son like a sheep) it is at
least possible that in this instance a mistake has prevailed. But if this
is so, the inquisitor would risk the danger of doing what would be
wrong in the highest degree; and in this very act he is behaving
un conscientiously (p. 175).
According to Kant, then, the inquisitor's situation is to be analyzed in epistemic terms along these lines. The duty not to kill people on account of
their religious faith is part of the pure religion of reason and lies within the
inner circle. The claim that it binds the inquisitor has a very high epistemic
status. By contrast, the claim that killing heretics is morally permissible, or
even required, belongs to the historical or revealed part of an ecclesiastical
faith and lies in that portion of the outer circle not also contained within the
inner circle. It has a lower epistemic status. And even if killing heretics
were apparently directly commanded by God, the claim that killing heretics
is not wrong would not acquire an epistemic status exceeding that of the
claim that killing heretics is wrong. Hence the inquisitor can never be sure
that killing a heretic is morally right. The inquisitor would therefore act
unconscientiously and thereby violate a duty by condemning a heretic, who
is otherwise a good citizen, to death. Kant generalizes from the example to
other cases in which following an injunction rooted in the historical or
revealed part of an ecclesiastical faith carries with it "the danger of disobedience to a human duty which is certain in and of itself" (p. 175). And presumably the generalization is meant by Kant to cover not only extreme
cases such killing heretics but also other uses of coercive measures by
church or state to suppress dissent from a particular ecclesiastical faith.
What is more, Kant extends the argument to acts allowable in themselves and taken by the revealed part of an ecclesiastical faith to be divinely
commanded such as worshipping in public on a certain day of the week or
professing firm belief in doctrines whose sole source is historical revelation. He asks whether ecclesiastical authorities mayor should impose
what they hold to be such positive revealed law on the laity as an article of
faith they must subscribe to on pain of forfeiting their status in their empirical church. The fault he finds with such an imposition is that "the clergyman would be requiring the people at least inwardly to confess something
to be as true as is their belief in God, i. e., to confess, as though in the presence of God, something which they do not know with certainty" (p. 175).
In doing this the clergyman would, Kant thinks, be acting in an unconscientious manner. He "would himself go counter to conscience in forcing
others to believe that of which he himself can never be wholly convinced;
he should therefore in justice consider well what he does, for he must
answer for all abuse arising out of such a compulsory faith" (p. 176). If we
take Kant's reference to being wholly convinced to concern complete psychological conviction, we will probably think he underestimates the extent
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to which the clergy can acquire convictions whose psychological certitude
outstrips their epistemic certainty. So we would probably do better to
attribute to him the thought that it is unconscientious and so contrary to
duty to force others to believe anything one cannot be, and so is not, epistemically certain of oneself. On this interpretation, the duty of conscientiousness supports, as Kant sees it, not only mutual toleration among
diverse ecclesiastical faiths but also free faith, that is, faith freely assented
to by all, within each of them.

IT!. Kant's Ecc/esiology Criticized and Revised
Christians may well wish to quarrel with Kant's ecclesiology on numerous points of detail. It might be argued, for example, that the text of the
Prologue to John's Gospel cannot support the interpretation of it Kant
sketches. Or, it might be claimed that Kant's understanding of the case of
the inquisitor and of the akedah is incorrect. He allows, after all, for the
remote possibility that the inquisitor has been ordered by God to kill
heretics by means of a divine command made known in extraordinary
fashion. And clearly it is within God's power, though it would indeed be
extraordinary, to provide evidence that would make the claim that such a
command had been given maximally certain. To be sure, as Kant notes,
even if God did this and the inquisitor took the command to have come
from God, it would remain possible that a mistake had prevailed.
However, one might disagree with the Kantian view according to which it
is maximally certain that it is always wrong to deprive someone of life for
heresy. It is also possible that there are exceptions to this moral principle.
So it seems at least possible for it to be more certain that God has commanded an inquisitor to kill a heretic than that it is wrong for the inquisitor
to do so. Similarly, it seems at least possible for it to be more certain that
Abraham has been commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac than that it is
wrong for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. Hence it seems at least possible for
there to be a conscientious inquisitor who condemns a heretic to death and
an Abraham who conscientiously consents to sacrifice Isaac.
But, for present purposes, I think it would not be useful to linger too
long over points of detail. I propose instead to proceed directly to what I
take to be the deepest objection to Kant's ecclesiology, which is a challenge
to its basic structure. The objection is that practical reason is just not up to
the task Kant assigns it in his ecclesiology. In order to present the objection, let me draw attention to a feature of Kant's image of the concentric
circles I have heretofore not mentioned. Kant needs the circumference of
the inner circle to mark two distinct boundaries. On the one hand, within
it lies the pure religion of reason, which consists of Kantian morality and
its postulated God, while outside it lie other historical and revealed doctrines of ecclesiastical faiths. On the other hand, within it lie propositions
with some very high epistemic status such as being certain in and of themselves while outside are to be found only propositions with one or another
lower epistemic status. Kant supposes that these two distinctions, one
based on kinds of doctrine and the other epistemologically based, coincide
in extension and so determine a single boundary. As I see it, this supposi-
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tion is the ground of his confidence that the pure religion of reason ought
to serve as the interpreter of ecclesiastical faiths and that, when conflict
arises, scripture must be interpreted in the interests of practical reason. It is
also what lies behind his view that the moral deliverances of practical reason are fit to serve as an Archimedean fixed point from which ecclesiastical
faiths, relegated to role of mere vehicles, can be subjected to critique, purification, reformation and perhaps even elimination. Yet there are, in my
opinion, two good reasons for us to doubt Kant's powerful supposition.
One stems from the historical fate of Kant's own moral theory. In the
course of the more than two centuries during which it has been debated, it
has not become the focus of a consensus on the part of all reasonable moral
inquirers who have considered it. Many reasonable people reject the conclusions Kant draws about the famous four examples of the Groundwork.
Of course there are strategies for salvaging parts of Kantian moral theory.
It can be argued, for instance, that Kant himself misunderstood his own
theory in some respects and thus made mistakes in applying it to one or
more of the four examples. The predictable result of such salvage operations, however, seems to me to be the plurality of reasonable views found
on the contemporary philosophical scene that are more or less Kantian in
spirit. And other modern moral theories have suffered similar fates. I
think Robert M. Adams has made the correct pessimistic induction. He
says: "Nothing in the history of modern secular ethical theory gives reason
to expect that general agreement on a single comprehensive ethical theory
will ever be achieved-or that, if achieved, it would long endure in a climate of free inquiry."" Like rock and roll, reasonable pluralism in moral
theory is here to stay. From the fact of reasonable pluralism in moral theory, I draw the conclusion that it is utopian to hope that, under conditions of
free inquiry, any moral theory will, in its entirety, ever acquire the high
epistemic status for all of us needed to fit it for the role Kant wanted his
moral theory to play in the universally shared pure religion of reason.
A second reason for skepticism about Kant's powerful supposition can
be generated from the method of reflective equilibrium that has received a
good deal of attention in recent discussion of the methodology of moral
theorizing. ls According to that method, roughly described, one is to seek
coherence in one's views, starting from one's considered judgments, by
proceeding first to a narrow equilibrium in ethics between judgments
about principles and judgments about particular cases and then to a wide
equilibrium between ethical judgments and judgments about other matters
such as the nature of human persons. In the course of employing the procedure, when cont1icts in judgment come up and must be resolved in the
interest of achieving coherence, one is to stick with the judgment that
seems to one more likely to be correct and reject or revise the other judgment. If the procedure is successful, its output will be a large and coherent
body of judgments, some ethical and some not. Suppose that one belief
seeming more likely than another to be correct is both a contributor to and
an indicator of the former having a higher epistemic status than the latter.
Consider people who have religious beliefs and treat them as inputs to the
process of seeking wide reflective equilibrium. Is it likely that at wide
reflective equilibrium their beliefs will be structured in a way that is aptly

526

Faith and Philosophy

represented by Kant's concentric circles? I think not.
Think first about what is likely to happen when the people under consideration proceed to narrow reflective equilibrium. Their method does
not guarantee convergence in judgment. I imagine it is possible that they
converge on a single set of moral judgments that coincides everywhere
with Kant's morality. But if they are even moderately diverse in cultural
background and personal experience, then, though some overlap in moral
judgment at narrow reflective equilibrium would not be surprising, it is
highly unlikely that there will be complete agreement on Kant's morality.
Think next about the move from narrow reflective equilibrium of moral
beliefs to wide reflective equilibrium of moral beliefs with theological
beliefs from historical sources or revelation. Again, I imagine it is possible
that, whenever conflict between moral beliefs and theological beliefs arises,
all the people being considered always resolve it by sticking with the moral
beliefs and revising or reinterpreting the theological beliefs. But this too is
vastly unlikely. It is much more likely that many of them will sometimes
resolve conflict in favor of moral beliefs and sometimes in favor of theological beliefs. Finally, think about the people in question after they have
reached theo-ethical coherence at wide reflective equilibrium; consider
what would be the result of trying to isolate for each of them an inner kernel of beliefs with maximal certainty or some comparable high epistemic
status by drawing a circle around exactly those beliefs. Would this inner
core consist in all cases of Kant's pure religion of reason? I grant that this is
possible, but, once more, I consider it extremely unlikely. It is very likely
that there would be no universally shared inner core at all. It is also very
likely that for many of the people under consideration the inner core, if
there were one, would contain a mixture of moral and theological beliefs
rather than consisting entirely of belief in Kant's morality and its deity.
I believe the method of wide reflective equilibrium is a useful method in
ethics. In the present context, however, it serves for me mainly as a device
for representing what is likely to happen in conditions of moderate cultural
and experiential diversity under the free play of human reason. My conclusion is that reason is unlikely to yield a comprehensive moral doctrine
capable of functioning as Kant expects his morality operate. It is highly
improbable that reason will carve out for all who employ it conscientiously
anything like Kant's pure religion of reason that can both be universally
shared and serve as a fixed point in a critique of the revelations of various
ecclesiastical faiths. From an epistemological point of view, Kant's ecclesiology is therefore excessively ambitious.
But it is important not to throw the baby out with the bath water. If we
look at things less systematically and more on a piecemeal basis, Tdare say
most of us will discover cases in which we have moral convictions we rightly consider more likely to be correct than competing convictions whose
source is the historical part of an ecclesiastical faith. So I see promise in a
chastened Kantianism that proceeds on a case by case basis to deploy moral
beliefs of high epistemic stahlS as levers, as it were, to move churches and
their members in the direction of reforming ecclesiastical arrangements and
reinterpreting scriptures. It may be that such a critical stance toward ecclesiastical faiths is only feasible in a culture in which there are accessible
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moral sources independent of ecclesiastical faith. If so, chastened Kantian
ecclesiology will be as much a product of modernity as Kant's own more
ambitious systematic project of ecclesiological critique was.
Something like a chastened Kantianism seems to be at work in a recent
discussion of the akedah by Robert M. Adams. In his Finite and Infinite
Goods, there is a chapter devoted to Abraham's dilemma, though the
Abraham of whom Adams speaks is not exactly the Abraham of the
Hebrew Bible. Adams operates with a methodology that allows for ethical
sources independent of theology to exert critical leverage on theological
ethics; he tells us that "we simply will not and should not accept a theological ethics that ascribes to God a set of commands that is too much at variance with the ethical outlook that we bring to our theological thinking."''!
He cites the passage from The Conflict of the Facuities, quoted above, in
which Kant provides Abraham with a reply to the supposedly divine
voice, and he goes on to say that it is not easy to reject Kant's verdict on the
case. Like Kant, Adams concentrates on the epistemological aspects of the
situation. He comes down on Kant's side of the epistemological issue.
Reflecting on the possibility of divinely commanded but otherwise unnecessary human sacrifices, he observes that "a situation in which I would
find it reasonable to believe that a good God had given such an abhorrent
command seems to me so unimaginable, however, that I think it is at best a
waste of spiritual energy to try to decide what one should do in that
case."20 And in the same vein, he concludes the chapter with the remark
that "the question whether God commands such a thing should stay off
our epistemological agenda as long as it possibly can, which I expect will
be forever."2l Yet Adams does not rule out altogether the possibility that
he might believe a divine command to sacrifice an innocent person had
been issued. He considers the story, told in Shalom Spiegel's The Last Trial,
of a Rabbi Samuel and his son Yehiel, also a rabbi, who were confronted
with the alternatives of death and forced conversion to Christianity.22 In
the story, Yehiel offers himself to be sacrificed, and Samuel kills him.
Commenting on it, Adams states that "if they claimed that God told them
to do what they did, I would not say that no such command could come
from God."23 It is in the spirit of the chastened Kantianism I find promising
to conduct discussion of the issue of divinely commanded human sacrifice
on a case by case basis, as Adams does. It is also consonant with its spirit
to expect some reasonable disagreement between him and others about
either the case of Abraham and Isaac or the case of Samuel and Yehiel or
about both cases.
But what, if anything, does Kantian ecclesiology, chastened or not, have
to do with actual Christian churches and the ecclesiologies their theologians provide for them? In conclusion, I address this question with reference to the Roman Catholic ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council.

IV. Chastened Kantian Ecdesiology and Roman Catholic Ecdesiology
No doubt there are contemporary religious movements that have gone a
long way toward the Kantian ideal of a largely moral core embedded in an
historical vehicle that minimizes commitment to revealed doctrine. Subject
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to correction by those who view them from the inside, I would say that
Unitarian Universalism is one example rooted in Christianity and Reform
Judaism is another. But the idea that the ecclesiology of the Roman
Catholic Church has moved in a Kantian direction may initially seem quite
surprising. I propose to explore this idea briefly with reference to the
ecclesiology of Vatican II, basing my discussion on the summary of that
ecclesiology found in Richard P. McBrien's magisterial Catholicism. It
would, of course, not be plausible to claim that Kant directly influenced the
ecclesiology of Vatican II. A standard history of the Catholic Church, written by the theologian McBrien praises as the most important ecclesiologist
of the twentieth century, does not even mention Kant in its brief treatment
of the Aufkliirung.24 However, I think it is plausible to view Kant as having
articulated in a particularly forceful and radical way thoughts that have
become increasingly influential in recent Catholic ecclesiology.
McBrien sums up the ecc1esiology of Vatican II in ten points and spells
out how each of them represents a change in Catholic thought. After
reporting what he says, I shall in each case add my own comparisons with
Kantian ecclesiology.
First, the church is, first and foremost, a mystery or sacrament.
According to McBrien, this principle "supplants the pre-Vatican II emphasis on the Church as a means of salvation."25 In Kant's ecclesiology, mystery
and sacrament lie outside the inner circle that circumscribes the pure religion of reason and belong to the part of ecclesiastical faith that is not
included in this religion. Yet the philosopher has no reason to deny them
provided they do not conflict with morality. They must, however, be
regarded as means, not of salvation but of strengthening human efforts to
create an ethical commonwealth. In my chastened Kantian ecclesiology, it
is not impossible in principle for claims about sacramentality to achieve
high epistemic status at wide reflective equilibrium. But there remains a
large gap between Kant's vision of the core of the church as nothing but a
moral community and the view of Vatican II that it is a mystery.
Second, the church is the whole people of God. McBrien takes this principle to have "replaced the pre-Vatican II emphasis on the Church as hierarchical institution, which tended to make the study of the Church more
akin to 'hierarchology' than to 'eccesiology'" (p. 684). This principle is consonant with Kant's ecclesiology in two ways. The ethical commonwealth,
which is the te/os of empirical churches, is to be represented as a people of
God, potentially universal in scope, under laws of virtue. And the principle's opposition to hierarchy matches Kant's insistence that the true visible
church will be neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy. The chastened
Kantian ecc1esiology I favor can endorse these two points of agreement
between Kant and Vatican II.
Third, the whole people of God-laity, religious, and clergy alike-is
called to participate in the mission of Christ as Prophet, Priest and King.
McBrien thinks this principle "replaces the pre-Vatican II notion of 'Catholic
Action,' wherein the laity participates only in the mission of the hierarchy"
(p.684). To the extent that the thrust of this principle is against hierarchy it
is harmonious with Kant's ecclesiology. However, there is tension between
its conception of the mission of Christ and Kant's christology. For Kant,
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Christ functions as the exemplar of humanity in its complete moral perfection and as the Teacher of the morality of the Gospels. Within the limits of
reason, Christ serves only moral purposes, though reason is not in a position to deny flatly other christological mysteries. Kant could, I think, find
no moral use for Christ as a king. He could allow there to be a role for
Christ as a prophet if we think of prophets chiefly as preachers of moral
reform. And he could even make room for a priestly function for Christ
provided it placed the emphasis on his work as what Kant describes as a
divine, that is, a teacher of moral religion, rather than as what Kant thinks of
as a priest, a steward of pious rites. So there is partial overlap rather than
complete coincidence between this principle of Vatican II and Kant's ecclesiology. My more latitudianarian chastened Kantianism leaves open the possibility of greater overlap with the principle at wide reflective equilibrium.
Fourth, the mission of the people of God includes service to human
needs in the social, political and economic orders as well as the preaching
of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments. McBrien argues that
this principle "supplants the pre-Vatican II notion of 'pre-evangelization,'
wherein such service is, or may be, a necessary preparation for the preaching of the Gospel (evangelization) but is not itself essential to the Church's
mission in the same way as the preaching or the celebration of the sacraments" (p. 684). By promoting service to human needs from the status of a
means to evangelization to that of a central part of the mission in its own
right, this principle takes a step in the direction of the Kantian view that
morality must be at the core of any church with prospects for becoming a
true church. Kant's own ecclesiology, however, would assign sacramentality to the part of ecclesiastical faith that belongs to the shell rather than the
kernel of pure moral religion. As previously noted, a chastened Kantian
ecclesiology does not guarantee that graduations in epistemic status will
enforce an invidious distinction of this sort.
Fifth, the church is realized and expressed at the local as well as the universallevel; it is a communion of churches. McBrien's view is that this principle "supplants the common pre-Vatican II notion that the Church is, for all
practical purposes, always understood as the Church universal, centralized
in the Vatican under the supreme authority of the pope, with each diocese
considered only as an administrative division of the Church universal, and
each parish, in turn, an administrative subdivision of the diocese" (p. 685).
Kant's ecclesiology does not go into detail about how to set up the administration of a large empirical church. But it does not aspire to the kind of universality that depends on securing agreement by submission to a centralized authority. Instead it looks for spontaneous agreement in morality that
derives from the self-legislation of practical reason in each of us. So Kant's
ecclesiology is consistent with the full realization of the moral core of the
pure religion of reason in local churches. Chastened Kantianism's more
modest expectation is that there will be a reasonable pluralism of moral
views both within and among local churches; it also supports the conclusion that a central authority's attempts to impose agreement in moral belief
are unlikely to succeed under conditions of free inquiry.
Sixth, the church embraces more than the Roman Catholic Church; it is
the whole Body of Christ: Catholics, Orthodox, Anglicans and Protestants
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alike. McBrien holds that this principle "sets aside the pre-Vatican II concept that the Roman Catholic Church alone is the one, true Church, and
that the other Christian communities (never called 'churches' before
Vatican II) are somehow 'related' to the Church but are not real members
of it" (p. 685). Like this principle, Kant's view rejects Roman Catholic
ecclesiological exclusivism. By Kant's lights, however, no actual Christian
church is, as we have seen, the true church, not even the true church militant. Yet, like this principle, his ecclesiology does allow that true religion
can be found in various Christian churches despite the diversity of their
modes of belief. A chastened Kantian ecclesiology will, of course, also
allow that various Christian churches can achieve epistemic parity.
Lacking Kant's pure religion of reason in its unadorned form to serve as a
telos for ecclesiastical development, chastened Kantianism cannot appeal to
it as a benchmark by which to judge that any actual Christian church falls
short of being a true church.
Seventh, the mission of the whole church is (a) one of proclamation of the
Gospel that is always subordinate to the Word of God; (b) one of celebration
of the sacraments in a way that engages the intelligent participation of worshippers; (c) one of witnessing to the Gospel through a life-style that is
marked by humility, compassion, respect for human rights, etc.; and (d) one
of service to those in need, both inside and outside the Church. McBrien
believes this principle "expands upon a narrower view of mission in preVatican II ecclesiology, namely, one that tended to restrict the mission to the
preaching of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments, and one
which perhaps paid too little attention to the missionary responsibility of
corporate witnessing to the Gospel" (pp. 685-686). To the extent that this
expansion's third and fourth points stress the importance of morality by
adding weight to the tasks of witnessing through virtuous living and serving those in need, they represent movement in the direction of Kant's ecclesiology and are compatible with chastened Kantianism. But, as we saw in
the discussion above of the fourth principle, the second point's emphasis on
sacramentality gives it role somewhat at odds with Kant's view that sacramentality is to be relegated to the empirical vehicle from which pure moral
religion should strive to free itself. And if the ranking referred to in the first
point involves subordinating the morality of the Gospels to revealed doctrine, Kant would surely insist that the proper order of subordination is the
reverse. A chastened Kantianism will not necessarily be in tension with the
ecclesiology of Vatican II on these two points.
Eighth, all authority in the church is to be exercised as a service and in a
collegial mode. McBrien maintains that this principle "is intended to transform the exercise of authority from one of domination and unilateral decision-making, as prevailed in the pre-Vatican II period" (p. 686). Since Kant
says repeatedly that the ministers of a church should be servants of its
invisible head and not high officials who exercise domination over its
members, he would undoubtedly approve of the intention to work such a
transformation in the exercise of ecclesiastical authority. Chastened
Kantianism too permits and can endorse change along these lines.
Ninth, religious truth is to be found outside the Body of Christ and
should be respected wherever it is found; in no case is anyone to be
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coerced to embrace Christianity or Catholicism. In McBrien's opinion, this
principle "replaces a too-exclusive understanding of revelation as
'Christian revelation,' as well as the formula 'Error has no rights'" (p. 686).
By means of this princple, Vatican II joins Kant in supporting religious
freedom and religious toleration, and these values have become sufficiently robust under democratic regimes that most chastened Kantians who
have the good fortune to live under such regimes would also support them
at wide reflective equilibrium. And both Kant's ecclesiology and its chastened kin lack the resources to establish the claim that revelation cannot
occur outside of Christianity.
Tenth, the nature and mission of the church are to be understood in relationship and in subordination to the Kingdom of God. McBrien supposes
that this principle "replaces what was perhaps the most serious preVatican II ecclesiological misunderstanding, namely, that the Church is
identical with the Kingdom of God" (p. 686). If this were so, he adds, the
church would be beyond all need for institutional reform. No doubt there
are eschatological differences between Kant and Vatican II. Kant thinks
that the gradual transition from ecclesiastical faith to the exclusive sovereignty of pure moral faith is the coming of the Kingdom of God. He tells
us: "We have good reason to say, however, that 'the Kingdom of God is
come unto us' once the principle of the gradual transition of ecclesiastical
faith to the universal religion of reason, and so to a (divine) ethical state on
earth, has become general and has also gained somewhere a public
foothold, even though the actual establishment of this state is still infinitely
removed from us" (p. 113). But even when the Kingdom has come in principle, there will remain, before it is established, an interval of time that may
never end or may end only in a divinely produced consummation.
Throughout that interval, critique and reform of ecclesiastical institutions
will continue to be needed. Though the picture Vatican II presents of what
the Kingdom of God will look like when it is fully realized may differ substantially from Kant's vision, the gap between the church of the present
and the foreseeable future and the Kingdom of the eschaton leaves similar
space for institutional critique and reform. It is likely that a gap of this
kind will also exist at wide reflective equilibrium in chastened Kantianism.
In order to paint a balanced and comprehensive picture of both convergences and divergences of the ecclesiologies of Kant and Vatican II, I have
covered all ten of the points under which McBrien organizes his treatment
of the ecclesiology of Vatican II. It is obvious that my discussion of that
ecclesiology does not delve deeply into it and is far from exhaustive. It
does, however, allow us to discern a pattern. By comparison with preVatican II Catholic views, the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents movement in a Kantian direction on several moral and political issues. They
include opposition to hierarchical domination in the church, recognition of
the centrality in the church's mission of moral service to those in need,
acceptance of reasonable ecclesiastical pluralism within Christianity, support for religious freedom and religious toleration and, most important of
all, acknowledgement of the continuing legitimacy of institutional critique
and reform. But sources of tension remain, the most salient of which is the
emphasis in the ecclesiology of Vatican II on sacramentality as a crucial
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part of the definition of the church and its mission. For Kant, a doctrine of
sacra mentality would belong to the part of ecclesiastical faith that is not
also a part of the pure religion of reason. Though he would allow that reason is not competent to deny such a doctrine provided it does not conflict
with morality, he would locate it, along with other historical or revealed
doctrines, in the vehicle of moral religion, which can be dispensed with in
principle, and deny it the importance it has in the ecclesiology of Vatican II.
T have argued that a chastened Kantianism, which is more realistic about
the limits of reason as we have come to understand them since the time of
Kant, would serve to reduce if not eliminate tension of this kind.
In ecclesiology, Kant may properly be conceived, in my opinion, as continuing and radicalizing the tradition of the Reformation. 26 Its slogan,
'Always Reforming: signals a recognition that, all things human being susceptible to corruption, the work of reformation is never done. By analogical extension, we may think of idolatry of a certain sort as the danger
against which ongoing reform is to help safeguard us. According to
Robert M. Adams, this sort of idolatry "happens when one fails to distinguish devotion to God or the good from devotion to one's own religion or
one's own idea of God or the good."27 One's church too can become an idol
in this sense. The ecclesiology of Vatican II insists that the Catholic Church
is not identical with the Kingdom of God; in so doing it opens a possibility
for ecclesiastical reform that counteracts the human tendency toward this
form of idolatry. In a more radical way, Kant had earlier made room for a
similar possibility by distinguishing between the empirical churches of the
ecclesiastical faiths and the true church of pure moral faith, which has not
yet been realized on earth and may never be fully realized unless God
intervenes. I think a less radical chastened Kantianism should not lose
sight of this possibility. Its ecclesiology should share with those of Kant
and Vatican II openness, stretching indefinitely into the future, to critique
and reform of ecclesiastical institutions. This is an important lesson
Christian philosophers can and should discover in Kantian philosophical
ecclesiology.28

University of Notre Dame
NOTES
1. For some examples, see the essays in Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement,
eds. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1989).
2. John E. Hare, The Moral Gap (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 35.
3. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans.
Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1960), p. 11. Hereafter page references to this work by Kant will be made parenthetically in the body of the text.
4. For critical discussion, see my "Original Sin, Radical Evil and Moral
Identity," Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984).
5. For a more detailed treatment of Kant's conception of the ethical commonwealth or, as he translates the German, ethical community, see Allen

KANTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ECCLESIOLOGY

533

Wood, "Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle Against Evil," Faith and
Philosophy 17 (2000).
6. Isaiah Berlin was fond of Kant's comparison of humanity to crooked
wood; a collection of his essays bears the title The Crooked Timber of Humanity.
7. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, "The Education of the Human Race," in
Lessing's Theological Writings, trans. Henry Chad wick (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1957), p. 83.
8. I thus side with Hare in a disagreement with Wood. See Hare, op. cit.,
pp.41-45.
9. This interpretation is supported by translation of the Religion by di
Giovanni in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. See
Religioll and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 186. According to this
translation, the doctrine of revelation "must be cherished and cultivated as a
mere means, though a most precious one, for giving meaning, diffusion and
continuity to natural religion even among the ignorant" (my emphasis).
10. After noting that, for Kant, the Christian church was seen as the precursor of a true ethical commonwealth, Keith Ward asks whether a universal
moral community is "what Jesus and his community of disciples was [sic] really concerned with." See Keith Ward, Religion and Community (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 303. Almost certainly the answer to this question is
negative. But we can also ask ourselves whether a universal moral community
is what the Christian church today ought to be really concerned with. This is
Kant's question. A negative answer to Ward's question does not entail a negative answer to Kant's question.
11. Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor
(Lincoln: University Nebraska Press, 1992), p. 65.
12. Ibid., p. 67.
13. Nicholas Wolterstorff, DiI'ine Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), p. 178.
14. Kant, The Conflict of the Facuities, p. 115.
15. Ibid., p. 115. I have Silently corrected a typo in the quotation.
16. For interesting discussion of Bayle'S views on toleration, see John
Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
17. Robert Merrihew Adams, "Religious Ethics in a Pluralistic Society," in
Prospects for a Common Morality, eds. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 97.
18. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1971), pp. 19-21 and 48-51, and Norman Daniels, "Wide Reflective
Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979).
19. Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Intinite Goods (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 256. .
20. Ibid., p. 290.
21. Ibid., p. 291.
22. Shalom Spiegel, The Last Trial, trans. Judah Goldin (Woodstock: Jewish
Lights, 1993), pp. 22-23.
23. Adams, Finite anq Infillite Goods, p. 286.
,
24. Yves Congar, L' Eglise: De saint Augustin ii l' fpoque moderne (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1970), pp. 409-412.
25. Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism, Vol. 2 (Minneapolis: Winston Press,
1980), p. 684. Hereafter pages references to this volume will be made parenthetically in the body of the text.
26. While I was working on this paper, I learned that my project,
announced above in my introduction, of trying to provoke Christian philoso-

534

Faith and Philosophy

phers to discuss ecclesiology has very recently been in part preempted by two
papers on Kierkegaard's ecclesiology, Michael Plekon's "Kierkegaard at the
End: His 'Last' Sermon, Eschatology and the Attack on the Church" and Bruce
H. Kirmmse's "The Thunderstorm: Kierkegaard's Ecclesiology," both published in Faith and Philosophy 17:1 (2000). Despite large differences in their
interpretations of Kierkegaard's view of the church, both Plekon and Kirmmse
portray him as further radicalizing, in ways that I would say go well beyond
Kant, the Reformation's tradition of critique of ecclesiastical institutions.
27. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 210.
28. I am grateful to Karl Ameriks, Richard P. McBrien and Thomas F.
O'Meara, OP, for helpful bibliographical suggestions. A shortened version of
this paper was the Konyndyk Memorial Lecture I gave to a session sponsored
by the Society of Christian Philosophers at the 2000 APA Central Division
Meeting. I dedicate the paper to the memory of Ken Konyndyk.

